

25X1X7

paper

31 December 1962



13. (Revised) We have little evidence of stockpiling of air supplies in the Tibetan area. We believe that if the Chinese exerted a maximum effort, they might be able to deliver a total of 2,240 tons daily to the Tibetan area over a short period, including 2,000 tons by road and 240 tons by air, ~~(which is the sum of 175 tons by road and 65 tons by air)~~

~~At least 1,000 tons per day by road.~~ On an annual average it is believed that not more than 1,600 tons per day could be delivered by road. We believe that up to 50 ~~large~~ transport aircraft could be diverted to support operations against India without imposing unacceptable restrictions on the overall Chinese air transport system. Under optimum conditions, these 50 transports could supply some 60 tons daily for a sustained period from railheads in China proper. Currently, the total tonnage delivered into Tibet is estimated to be 500 to 700 tons daily, virtually all by road.

14. (Revised) We do not agree with the number of sorties listed for the alternate operations listed in paragraph 23. The study shows 35 short tons (paragraphs 21 and 22) as a basis for the sortie computation. This does not support paragraph 23(a), (b), (c) and (d). We believe that paragraph 23, item (a) requires about 85 short tons per day, item (b) requires about 104 short tons per day, item (c) requires about 67 short tons per day, and item (d) requires about 18 short tons per day. Moreover, the US believes

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that based on a 60 short ton per day logistics supply, the Chinese Communists could support the following alternate operations:

- (a) 6 light bomber sorties at 3 short tons per flying hour, or 2
- (b) 16 piston light bomber sorties at 1 short ton per flying hour, or 2
- (c) 28-31 jet fighter sorties at 1 1/2 short tons per flying hour, or 2
- (d) 32-37 jet ground support sorties at 2 short tons per flying hour.

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14a. There is no reason to assume that Chinese Communist air operations would be restricted to supplies which could be delivered to air bases by air. Of the potential for daily supply to the Tibetan area, we believe some 500 tons could be allocated for the support of air operations.



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